Hugo Chávez

Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías is the current President of Venezuela, having held that position since 1999.

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Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (Spanish pronunciation: [ˈuɣo rafaˈel ˈtʃaβes ˈfɾ]; born 28 July 1954) is the current President of Venezuela, having held that position since 1999. He was formerly the leader of the Fifth Republic Movement political party from its foundation in 1997 until 2007, when he became the leader of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Following his own political ideology of Bolivarianism and "Socialism for the 21st Century", he has focused on implementing socialist reforms in the country as a part of a social project known as the Bolivarian Revolution, which has seen the implementation of a new constitution, participatory democratic councils, the nationalisation of several key industries, improvements in health care and education, and significant reductions in poverty.[1]

Born into a working-class family in Sabaneta, Barinas, Chávez became a career military officer, and after becoming dissatisfied with the Venezuelan political system, he founded the secretive Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 (MBR-200) in the early 1980s to work towards overthrowing it. Chávez led the MBR-200 in an unsuccessful coup d'état against the Democratic Action government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez government in 1992, for which he was imprisoned. Getting out of prison after two years, he founded a social democratic political party, the Fifth Republic Movement, and was elected president of Venezuela in 1998. He subsequently introduced a new constitution which increased rights for marginalised groups and altered the structure of Venezuelan government, and was re-elected in 2000. During his second presidential term, he introduced a system of Bolivarian Missions, Communal Councils and worker-managed cooperatives, as well as a program of land reform, whilst also nationalising various key industries. On 7 October 2012, Chávez won his country's presidential election for a third time defeating Henrique Capriles and will serve for another six years.[2]

Chávez describes his policies to be anti-imperialist, and he is a vocal critic of neoliberalism and capitalism more generally, Chávez has been a prominent adversary of the United States' foreign policy.[3] Allying himself strongly with the Communist governments of Fidel and then Raúl Castro in Cuba and the Socialist governments of Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, his presidency is seen as a part of the socialist "pink tide" sweeping Latin America. He has supported Latin American and Caribbean cooperation and was instrumental in setting up the pan-regional Union of South American Nations, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Bank of the South, and the regional television network TeleSur. Chávez is a highly controversial and divisive figure both at home and abroad.

Early life

Childhood: 1954–1970

Sabaneta, Barinas, where Chávez was born and raised.

Hugo Chávez was born on 28 July 1954 in his paternal grandmother Rosa Inéz Chávez's home, a modest three-room house located in the rural village Sabaneta, Barinas State. The Chávez family were of Amerindian, Afro-Venezuelan, and Spanish descent.[4] His parents, Hugo de los Reyes Chávez and Elena Frías de Chávez, were working-lower middle class schoolteachers who lived in the small village of Los Rastrojos. Hugo was born the second of seven children, including their eldest, Adán Chávez.[5][6] The couple lived in poverty, leading them to send Hugo and Adán to live with their grandmother Rosa,[7] whom Hugo would later describe as being "a pure human being... pure love, pure kindness."[8] She was a devout Roman Catholic, and Hugo was an altar boy at a local church.[9] Hugo described his childhood as "poor...very happy", and experienced "humility, poverty, pain, sometimes not having anything to eat", and "the injustices of this world."[10]

Attending the Julián Pino Elementary School, Chávez's hobbies included drawing, painting, baseball and history. He was particularly interested in the 19th-century federalist general Ezequiel Zamora, in whose army his own great-great-grandfather had served.[11][12] In the mid-1960s, Hugo, his brother and their grandmother moved to the city of Barinas so that the boys could attend what was then the only high school in the rural state, the Daniel O'Leary High School.[13]

Military Academy: 1971–1975

Aged seventeen, Chávez decided to study at the Venezuelan Academy of Military Sciences in Caracas. At the Academy, he was a member of the first class that was following a restructured curriculum known as the Andrés Bello Plan. This plan had been instituted by a group of progressive, nationalistic military officers who believed that change was needed within the military. This new curriculum encouraged students to learn not only military routines and tactics but also a wide variety of other topics, and to do so civilian professors were brought in from other universities to give lectures to the military cadets.[14][15][16] Living in Caracas, he saw more of the endemic poverty faced by working class Venezuelans, something that echoed the poverty he had experienced growing up, and he has maintained that this experience only made him further committed to achieving social justice.[17][18] He also began to get involved in local activities outside of the military school, playing both baseball and softball with the Criollitos de Venezuela team, progressing with them to the Venezuelan National Baseball Championships. Other hobbies that he undertook at the time included writing numerous poems, stories and theatrical pieces, painting[19] and researching the life and political thought of 19th-century South American revolutionary Simón Bolívar.[20] He also became interested in the Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara (1928–1967) after reading his memoir The Diary of Che Guevara, although he also read books by a wide variety of other figures, from Karl Marx to Hannibal and Napoleon Bonaparte.[21]

In 1974 he was selected to be a representative in the commemorations for the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Ayacucho in Peru, the conflict in which Simon Bolívar's lieutenant, Antonio José de Sucre, defeated royalist forces during the Peruvian War of Independence. It was in Peru that Chávez heard the leftist president, General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1910–1977), speak, and inspired by Velasco's ideas that the military should act in the interests of the working classes when the ruling classes were perceived as corrupt,[22] he "drank up the books [Velasco had written], even memorising some speeches almost completely."[23] Befriending the son of Panamanian President Omar Torrijos (1929–1981), another leftist military general, Chávez subsequently visited Panama, where he met with Torrijos, and was impressed with his land reform program that was designed to benefit the peasants. Being heavily influenced by both Torrijos and Velasco, he saw the potential for military generals to seize control of a government when the civilian authorities were perceived as serving the interests of only the wealthy elites.[22][24] In contrast to military presidents like Torrijos and Velasco however, Chávez became highly critical of Augusto Pinochet, the right-wing general who had recently seized control in Chile with the aid of the American CIA.[25] Chávez would later relate that "With Torrijos, I became a Torrijist. With Velasco I became a Velasquist. And with Pinochet, I became an anti-Pinochetist."[26] In 1975, Chávez graduated from the military academy, being rated one of the top graduates of the year (eight out of seventy five).[27][28][29]

Early military career: 1976–1981

I think that from the time I left the academy I was oriented toward a revolutionary movement... The Hugo Chávez who entered there was a kid from the hills, a Ilanero with aspirations of playing professional baseball. Four years later, a second-lieutenant came out who had taken the revolutionary path. Someone who didn’t have obligations to anyone, who didn't belong to any movement, who was not enrolled in any party, but who knew very well where I was headed.


Following his graduation, Chávez was stationed as a communications officer at a counterinsurgency unit in Barinas,[31] although the Marxist-Leninist insurgency which the army was sent to combat had already been eradicated from that state, leaving the unit with much spare time. Chávez himself played in a local baseball team, wrote a column for the local newspaper, organized bingo games and judged at beauty pageants.[32] At one point he found in an abandoned car riddled with bullet holes a stash of Marxist literature that apparently had belonged to insurgents many years before. He went on to read these books, which included titles by such theoreticians as Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and Mao Zedong, but his favourite was a work entitled The Times of Ezequiel Zamora, written about the 19th-century federalist general whom Chávez had admired as a child.[33] These books further convinced Chávez of the need for a leftist government in Venezuela, later remarking that "By the time I was 21 or 22, I made myself a man of the left."[34]

In 1977, Chávez's unit was transferred to Anzoátegui, where they were involved in battling the Red Flag Party, a Marxist-Hoxhaist insurgency group.[35] After intervening to prevent the beating of an alleged insurgent by other soldiers,[36] Chávez began to have his doubts about the army and their methods in using torture.[34] At the same time, he was becoming increasingly critical of the corruption in both the army and in the civilian government, coming to believe that despite the wealth being produced by the country's oil reserves, Venezuela's poor masses were not receiving their share, something he felt to be inherently un-democratic. In doing so, he began to sympathise with the Red Flag Party and their cause, if not their violent methods.[37]

In 1977, he founded a revolutionary movement within the armed forces, in the hope that he could one day introduce a leftist government to Venezuela: the Venezuelan People's Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo de Venezuela, or ELPV), was a secretive cell within the military that consisted of him and a handful of his fellow soldiers. Although they knew that they wanted a middle way between the right wing policies of the government and the far left position of the Red Flag, they did not have any plans of action for the time being.[36][38][39] Nevertheless, hoping to gain an alliance with civilian leftist groups in Venezuela, Chávez then set about clandestinely meeting various prominent Marxists, including Alfredo Maneiro (the founder of the Radical Cause) and Douglas Bravo, despite having numerous political differences with them.[40][41] At this time, Chávez married a working-class woman named Nancy Colmenares, with whom he would go on to have three children: Rosa Virginia (born September 1978), Maria Gabriela (born March 1980) and Hugo Rafael (born October 1983).[42]

Revolutionary activity

Later military career and the Bolivarian Revolutionary Army-200: 1982–1991

Five years after his creation of the ELPV, Chávez went on to form a new secretive cell within the military, the Bolivarian Revolutionary Army-200 (EBR-200), later redesignated the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 (MBR-200).[14][43][44] Taking inspiration from three Venezuelans whom Chávez deeply admired, Ezequiel Zamora (1817–1860), Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) and Simón Rodríguez (1769–1854), these historical figures became known as the "three roots of the tree" of the MBR-200.[45][46] Later describing the group's foundation, Chávez would state that "the Bolivarian movement that was being born did not propose political objectives... Its goals were imminently internal. Its efforts were directed in the first place to studying the military history of Venezuela as a source of a military doctrine of our own, which up to then didn't exist."[47] However, he always hoped that the Bolivarian Movement would become politically dominant, and on his political ideas at the time, remarked that "This tree [of Bolívar, Zamora and Rodríguez] has to be a circumference, it has to accept all kinds of ideas, from the right, from the left, from the ideological ruins of those old capitalist and communist systems."[48] Indeed, Irish political analyst Barry Cannon noted that the early Bolivarian ideology was explicitly capitalist, but that it "was a doctrine in construction, a heterogeneous amalgam of thoughts and ideologies, from universal thought, capitalism, Marxism, but rejecting the neoliberal models currently being imposed in Latin America and the discredited socialist and communist models of the old Soviet Bloc."[49]

In 1981, Chávez, by now a captain, was assigned to teach at the military academy where he had formerly trained. Here he indoctrinated new students in his so-called "Bolivarian" ideals, and recruited those whom he felt would make good members of the MBR-200, as well as organizing sporting and theatrical events for the students. In his recruiting attempts he was relatively successful, for by the time they had graduated, at least thirty out of 133 cadets had joined it.[50] In 1984 he met a Venezuelan woman of German ancestry named Herma Marksman who was a recently divorced history teacher. Sharing many interests in common, she eventually got involved in Chávez's movement and the two fell in love, having an affair that would last several years.[51][52] Another figure to get involved with the movement was Francisco Arias Cárdenas, a soldier particularly interested in liberation theology.[53] Cárdenas rose to a significant position within the group, although came into ideological conflict with Chávez, who believed that they should begin direct military action in order to overthrow the government, something Cárdenas thought was reckless.[54]

However, some senior military officers became suspicious of Chávez after hearing rumours about the MBR-200. Unable to dismiss him legally without proof, they re-assigned him so that he would not be able to gain any more fresh new recruits from the academy. He was sent to take command of the remote barracks at Elorza in Apure State,[55] where he got involved in the local community by organizing social events, and contacted the local indigenous tribal peoples, the Cuiva and Yaruro. Although they were distrustful due to their mistreatment at the hands of the Venezuelan army in previous decades, Chávez gained their trust by joining the expeditions of an anthropologist to meet with them. His experiences with them would later lead him to introduce laws protecting the rights of indigenous tribal peoples when he gained power many years later.[56] While on holiday, he retraced on foot the route taken by his great-grandfather, the revolutionary Pedro Pérez Delgado (known as Maisanta), to understand his family history; on that trip, he met a woman who told Chávez how Maisanta had become a local hero by rescuing an abducted girl.[57] In 1988, after being promoted to the rank of major, the high-ranking General Rodríguez Ochoa took a liking to Chávez and employed him to be his assistant at his office in Caracas.[58]

Operation Zamora: 1992

In 1989, Carlos Andrés Pérez (1922–2010), the candidate of the centrist Democratic Action Party, was elected President after promising to oppose the United States government's Washington Consensus and financial policies recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nevertheless, he did neither once he got into office, following instead the neoliberal economic policies supported by the United States and the IMF. He dramatically cut spending, put prominent men in governmental posts. Pérez's policies angered some of the public.[59][60][61] In an attempt to stop the widespread protests and looting that followed his social spending cuts, Pérez ordered the violent repression and massacre of protesters known as El Caracazo, which "according to official figures ... left a balance of 276 dead, numerous injured, several disappeared and heavy material losses. However, this list was invalidated by the subsequent appearance of mass graves", indicating that the official death count was inadequate.[62][63][64] Pérez had used both the DISIP political police and the army to orchestrate El Caracazo. Chávez did not participate in the repression because he was then hospitalized with chicken pox, and later condemned the event as "genocide".[65][66]

Disturbed by the Caracazo, rampant government corruption, the domination of politics by the Venezuelan oligarchy through the Punto Fijo Pact, and what he called "the dictatorship of the IMF", Chávez began preparing for a military coup d'état,[64][67] known as Operation Zamora.[68] Initially planned for December, Chávez delayed the MBR-200 coup until the early twilight hours of 4 February 1992. On that date, five army units under Chávez's command moved into urban Caracas with the mission of overwhelming key military and communications installations, including the Miraflores presidential palace, the defense ministry, La Carlota military airport and the Military Museum. Chávez's immediate goal was to intercept and take custody of Pérez, who was returning to Miraflores from an overseas trip. Despite years of planning, the coup quickly encountered trouble. At the time of the coup, Chávez had the loyalty of less than 10% of Venezuela's military forces,[69] and, because of numerous betrayals, defections, errors, and other unforeseen circumstances, Chávez and a small group of rebels found themselves hiding in the Military Museum, without any means of conveying orders to their network of spies and collaborators spread throughout Venezuela.[70] Furthermore, Chávez's allies were unable to broadcast their prerecorded tapes on the national airwaves, during which Chávez planned to issue a general call for a mass civilian uprising against the Pérez government. Finally, Chávez's forces were unable to capture Pérez, who managed to escape from them. Fourteen soldiers were killed, and fifty soldiers and some eighty civilians injured during the ensuing violence.[71][72][73]

Realising that the coup had failed, Chávez gave himself up to the government. On the condition that he called upon the remaining active coup members to cease hostilities, he was allowed to appear on national television, something that he insisted on doing in his military uniform. During this address, he invoked the name of national hero Simón Bolívar and declared to the Venezuelan people that "Comrades: unfortunately, for now, the objectives we had set for ourselves were not achieved in the capital city. That is, those of us here in Caracas did not seize power. Where you are, you have performed very well, but now is the time for a reflect. New opportunities will arise and the country has to head definitively toward a better future."[74] Many viewers noted that Chávez had remarked that he had failed only "por ahora" (for now),[14][75][76][77][78] and he was immediately catapulted into the national spotlight, with many Venezuelans, particularly those from the poorer sections of society, seeing him as a figure who had stood up against government corruption and kleptocracy.[79][80][81]

Chávez was arrested and imprisoned at the San Carlos military stockade, where he remained wracked with guilt, feeling responsible for the coup's failure.[82][83] Indeed, pro-Chávez demonstrations that took place outside of San Carlos led to his being transferred to Yare prison soon after.[84] The government meanwhile began a temporary crackdown on media supportive of Chávez and the coup.[85] A further attempted coup against the government occurred in November, which was once more defeated,[67][86] although Pérez himself was impeached a year later for malfeasance and misappropriation of funds for illegal activities.[87][88]

Political rise: 1992–1998

Whilst Chávez and the other senior members of the MBR-200 were in prison, his relationship with Herma Marksman broke up in July 1993.[89] She would subsequently become a critic of Chávez.[90] In 1994, Rafael Caldera (1916–2009) of the centrist National Convergence Party was elected to the presidency, and soon after taking power, freed Chávez and the other imprisoned MBR-200 members as per his pre-election pledge. Caldera had however imposed upon them the condition that they would not return to the military, where they could potentially organise another coup.[91][92] After being mobbed by adoring crowds following his release, Chávez went on a 100-day tour of the country, promoting his Bolivarian cause of social revolution.[93] Now living off a small military pension as well as the donations of his supporters, he continued to financially support his three children and their mother despite divorcing Nancy Colmenares around this period. On his tours around the country, he would meet Marisabel Rodríguez, who would give birth to their daughter shortly before becoming his second wife in 1997.[94][95]

Travelling around Latin America in search of foreign support for his Bolivarian movement, he visited Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, and finally Cuba, where the Communist leader Fidel Castro (1926–) arranged to meet him. After spending several days in one another's company, Chávez and Castro became friends with the former describing the Cuban leader as being like a father to him.[96] Returning to Venezuela, Chávez failed to gain mainstream media attention for his political cause. Instead, he gained publicity from small, local-based newspapers and media outlets.[97] As a part of his condemnation of the ruling class, Chávez became critical of President Caldera, whose neoliberal economic policies had caused inflation and who had both suspended constitutional guarantees and arrested a number of Chávez's supporters.[98] According to the United Nations, by 1997 the per capita income for Venezuelan citizens had fallen to US$ 2,858 from US$ 5,192 in 1990, whilst poverty levels had increased by 17.65% since 1980, and homicide and other crime rates had more than doubled since 1986, particularly in Caracas.[99] Coupled with this drop in the standard of living, widespread dissatisfaction with the representative democratic system in Venezuela had "led to gaps emerging between rulers and ruled which favoured the emergence of a populist leader".[100]

A debate soon developed in the Bolivarian movement as to whether it should try to take power in elections or whether it should instead continue to believe that military action was the only effective way of bringing about political change. Chávez was a keen proponent of the latter view, believing that the oligarchy would never allow him and his supporters to win an election,[101] whilst Francisco Arias Cárdenas instead insisted that they take part in the representative democratic process. Cárdenas himself proved his point when, after joining the Radical Cause socialist party, he won the December 1995 election to become governor of the oil-rich Zulia State.[102] Subsequently changing his opinion on the issue, Chávez and his supporters in the Bolivarian movement decided to found their own political party, the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR—Movimiento Quinta República) in July 1997 in order to support Chávez's candidature in the Venezuelan presidential election, 1998.[71][103][104][105]

The election of a leftist president in Venezuela in 1998 foreshadowed what would, in the following seven years, become a wave of successes for left-leaning presidential candidates in Latin America... Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva in Brazil in October 2002, then Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador in January 2003, Néstor Kirchner in Argentina in May 2003, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay in October 2004, Evo Morales in Bolivia in December 2005, Rafael Correa in Ecuador in November 2006, and then Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, also in November 2006. While some of these moderated [towards the centre or centre-right] significantly shortly after taking office, such as Gutiérrez and da Silva, they represent a wave of left-of-center leaders whose election came as a bit of a surprise given the... disorientation within the left around the world.


1998 election

At the start of the election run-up, most polls gave Irene Sáez, then-mayor of Caracas' richest district, Chacao, the lead. Although an independent candidate, she had the backing of one of Venezuela's two primary political parties, Copei.[107] In opposition to her right-wing and pro-establishment views, Chávez and his followers described their aim as "laying the foundations of a new republic" to replace the existing one, which they cast as "party-dominated"; the current constitution, they argued, was no more than the "legal-political embodiment of puntofijismo", the country's traditional two-party patronage system.[108] This revolutionary rhetoric gained Chávez and the MVR support from a number of other leftist parties, including the Patria Para Todos (Motherland for All), the Partido Comunist Venezolano (Venezeuelan Communist Party) and the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism), which together fashioned a political union supporting his candidacy called the Polo Patriotic (Patriotic Pole).[105][109]

Chávez's promises of widespread social and economic reforms won the trust and favor of a primarily poor and working class following. By May 1998, Chávez's support had risen to 30% in polls, and by August he was registering 39%.[110] Much of his support came from his 'strong man' populist image and charismatic appeal.[111] This rise in popularity worried Chávez's opponents, with the oligarchy-owned mainstream media proceeding to attack him with a series of allegations, which included the claim – which he dismissed as ridiculous – that he was a cannibal who ate children.[112] With his support increasing, and Sáez's decreasing, both the main two political parties, Copei and Democratic Action, put their support behind Henrique Salas Römer, a Yale University-educated economist who representated the Project Venezuela party.[113]

Chávez won the election with 56.20% of the vote. Salas Römer came second, with 39.97%, whilst the other candidates, including Irene Sáez and Alfaro Ucero, gained only tiny proportions of the vote.[88][114] Academic analysis of the election showed that Chávez's support had come primarily from the country's poor and the "disenchanted middle class", whose standard of living had decreased rapidly in the previous decade,[115] although at the same time much of the middle and upper class vote had instead gone to Salas Römer.[116] Following the announcement of his victory, Chávez gave a speech in which he declared that "The resurrection of Venezuela has begun, and nothing and no one can stop it."[114]


First Presidential Term: 2 February 1999 – 10 January 2001

A triumphant Hugo Chávez visiting Porto Alegre, Brazil in 2003.

Chávez's presidential inauguration took place on 2 February 1999, and during the usual presidential oath he deviated from the prescribed words to proclaim that "I swear before my people that upon this moribund constitution I will drive forth the necessary democratic transformations so that the new republic will have a Magna Carta befitting these new times."[117][118] He subsequently set about appointing new figures to a number of government posts, including promoting various leftist allies to key positions; he for instance gave one of the founders of MBR, Jesús Urdaneta, the position in charge of the secret police; and made one of the 1992 coup leaders, Hernán Grüber Ódreman, governor of the Federal District of Caracas.[119] Chávez also appointed some conservative, centrist and centre-right figures to government positions as well, reappointing Caldera's economy minister Maritza Izaquirre to that same position and also appointing the businessman Roberto Mandini to be president of the state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela.[120] His critics referred to this group of government officials as the "Boliburguesía" or "Bolivarian bourgeoisie",[121][122] and highlighted the fact that it "included few people with experience in public administration."[117] He also made several alterations to his presidential privileges, scrapping the presidential limousine, giving away his entire presidential wage of $1,200 a month to a scholarship fund,[123] and selling off many of the government-owned airplanes, although alternately many of his critics accused him of excessive personal expenses for himself, his family and friends.[124] The involvement of a number of his immediate family members in Venezuelan politics has also led to accusations of nepotism, something Chávez denies.[125] Meanwhile, in June 2000 he separated from his wife Marisabel, and their divorce was finalised in January 2004.[126]

Although he publicly used strong revolutionary rhetoric from the beginning of his presidency, the Chávez government's initial policies were moderate, capitalist and centre-left, having much in common with those of contemporary Latin American leftists like Brazil's president Lula da Silva.[127][128] Chávez initially believed that capitalism was still a valid economic model for Venezuela, but that it would have to be Rhenish capitalism or the Third Way that would be followed rather than the neoliberalism which had been implemented under former governments with the encouragement of the United States.[129] He followed the economic guidelines recommended by the International Monetary Fund and continued to encourage foreign corporations to invest in Venezuela,[130] even visiting the New York Stock Exchange in the United States in an attempt to convince wealthy investors to do so.[131][132] To increase his visibility abroad, Chávez spent fifty-two days of his first year as president outside of Venezuela, travelling the world meeting various national leaders, such as American President Bill Clinton, Governor of Texas George W. Bush and Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin.[133]

Whilst he was remaining fiscally conservative, he introduced measures in an attempt to alleviate the poverty of the Venezuelan working class. Chávez immediately set into motion a social welfare program called Plan Bolívar 2000, which he organised to begin on 27 February 1999, the tenth anniversary of the Caracazo massacre. Costing $113,000,000, Plan Bolívar 2000 involved 70,000 army officers going out into the streets of Venezuela where they would repair roads and hospitals, offer free medical care and vaccinations, and sell food at cheap prices.[134][135][136] Chávez himself described the Plan by saying that "Ten years ago we came to massacre the people. Now we are going to fill them with love. Go and comb the land, search out and destroy poverty and death. We are going to fill them with love instead of lead."[137] In order to explain his latest thoughts and plans to the Venezuelan people, in May he also launched his own Sunday morning radio show, Aló Presidente (Hello, President), on the state radio network, as well as a Thursday night television show, De Frente con el Presidente (Face to Face with the President). He followed this with his own newspaper, El Correo del Presidente (The President's Post), founded in July, for which he acted as editor-in-chief, but which was later shut amidst accusations of corruption in its management.[138] In his television and radio shows, he answered calls from citizens, discussed his latest policies, sung songs and told jokes, making it unique not only in Latin America but the entire world.[139]

Constitutional reform

Chávez holds a miniature copy of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution at the 2005 World Social Forum held in Brazil.

Chávez then called for a public referendum – something virtually unknown in Venezuela at the time – which he hoped would support his plans to form a constitutional assembly, composed of representatives from across Venezuela, as well as from indigenous tribal groups, which would be able to rewrite the nation's constitution. The referendum went ahead on 25 April 1999, and was an overwhelming success for Chávez, with 88% of voters supporting the proposal.[140][141]

Following this, Chávez called for an election to take place on 25 July, in which the members of the constitutional assembly would be voted into power.[142] Of the 1,171 candidates standing for election to the assembly, over 900 of them were opponents of Chávez, but despite this, his supporters won another overwhelming electoral victory, taking 125 seats (95% of the total), including all of those belonging to indigenous tribal groups, whereas the opposition were voted into only 6 seats.[140][143][144] On 12 August 1999, the new constitutional assembly voted to give themselves the power to abolish government institutions and to dismiss officials who were perceived as being corrupt or operating only in their own interests. Whilst supporters of the move believed that it could force reforms that had been blocked by corrupt politicians and judicial authorities for years, many opponents of the Chávez regime argued that it gave Chávez and the Bolivarians too much power at the expense of their political opponents, and was therefore dictatorial.[145][146]

The elected members of the constituent assembly put together a new constitution, and a referendum on the issue of whether to adopt it was held in December 1999; the referendum saw an abstention vote of over 50%, although amongst those voting, 72% approved the new constitution's adoption.[144][147][148] The new constitution included increased protections for indigenous peoples and women, and established the rights of the public to education, housing, healthcare and food. It added new environmental protections, and increased requirements for government transparency. It increased the presidential term from five to six years, allowed people to recall presidents by referendum, and added a new presidential two-term limit. It converted the bicameral legislature, a Congress with both a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, into a unicameral one comprising only a National Assembly.[149][150][151][152] The constitution gave greater powers to the president, not only by extending their term but also by giving them the power to legislate on citizen rights as well as the economic and financial matters that they were formerly unable to do.[153] It also gave the military a role in the government by providing it with the mandated role of ensuring public order and aiding national development, something it had been expressely forbidden from doing under the former constitution.[153] As a part of the new constitution, the country, which was then officially known as the Republic of Venezuela, was renamed the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (República Bolivariana de Venezuela) at Chávez's request, thereby reflecting the government's ideology of Bolivarianism and the influence of Simón Bolívar on the nation as a whole.[143][144]

Second Presidential Term: 10 January 2001 – 10 January 2007

Under the new constitution, it was legally required that new elections be held in order to relegimatize the government and president. This presidential election in July 2000 would be a part of a greater "megaelection", the first time in the country's history that the president, governors, national and regional congressmen, mayors and councilmen would be voted for on the same day.[154][155][156] For the position of president, Chávez's closest challenger proved to be his former friend and co-conspirator in the 1992 coup, Francisco Arias Cárdenas, who since becoming governor of Zulia state had turned towards the political centre and begun to denounce Chávez as autocratic.[157] Although some of his supporters feared that he had alienated those in the middle class and the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy who had formerly supported him, Chávez was re-elected with 59.76% of the vote (the equivalent of 3,757,000 people), a larger majority than his 1998 electoral victory,[158][159] again primarily receiving his support from the poorer sectors of Venezuelan society.[160]

That year, Chávez helped to further cement his geopolitical and ideological ties with the Cuban government of Fidel Castro by signing an agreement under which Venezuela would supply Cuba with 53,000 barrels of oil per day at preferential rates, in return receiving 20,000 trained Cuban medics and educators. In the ensuing decade, this would be increased to 90,000 barrels a day (in exchange for 40,000 Cuban medics and teachers), dramatically aiding the Caribbean island's economy and standard of living after its "Special Period" of the 1990s.[161] However, Venezuela's growing alliance with Cuba came at the same time as a deteriorating relationship with the United States: in late 2001, just after the American-led invasion of Afghanistan in retaliation for the 11 September attacks against the U.S. by Islamist militants, Chávez showed pictures of Afghan children killed in a bomb attack on his television show. He commented that "They are not to blame for the terrorism of Osama Bin Laden or anyone else", and called on the American government to end "the massacre of the innocents. Terrorism cannot be fought with terrorism." The U.S. government responded negatively to the comments, which were picked up by the media worldwide.[162]

Chávez's second term in office saw the implementation of social missions, such as this one to eliminate illiteracy in Venezuela.

Meanwhile, the 2000 elections had led to Chávez's supporters gaining 101 out of 165 seats in the Venezuelan National Assembly, and so in November 2001 they voted to allow him to pass 49 social and economic decrees.[163][164] This move antagonized the opposition movement particularly strongly.[156]

At the start of the 21st century, Venezuela was the world's fifth largest exporter of crude oil, with oil accounting for 85.3% of the country's exports, therefore dominating the country's economy.[165][166] Previous administrations had sought to privatise this industry, with U.S. corporations having a significant level of control, but the Chávez administration wished to curb this foreign control over the country's natural resources by nationalising much of it under the state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). In 2001, the government introduced a new Hydrocarbons Law through which they sought to gain greater state control over the oil industry: they did this by raising royalty taxes on the oil companies and also by introducing the formation of "mixed companies", whereby the PdVSA could have joint control with private companies over industry. By 2006, all of the 32 operating agreements signed with private corporations during the 1990s had been converted from being primarily or solely corporate-run to being at least 51% controlled by PdVSA.[165]

Growing opposition and the CD

During Chávez's first term in office, the opposition movement had been "strong but reasonably contained, [with] complaints centring mainly on procedural aspects of the implementation of the constitution".[156] However, the first organized protest against the Bolivarian government occurred in January 2001, when the Chávez administration tried to implement educational reforms through the proposed Resolution 259 and Decree 1.011, which would have seen the publication of textbooks with a heavy Bolivarian bias. The protest movement, which was primarily by middle class parents whose children went to privately run schools, marched to central Caracas shouting out the slogan "Don't mess with my children." Although the protesters were denounced by Chávez, who called them "selfish and individualistic," the protest was successful enough for the government to retract the proposed education reforms and instead enter into a consensus-based educational program with the opposition.[167] That year, an organization known as the Coordinadora Democrática de Acción Cívica (CD) was founded, under which the Venezuelan opposition political parties, corporate powers, most of the country's media, the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce, the Frente Institucional Militar and the Central Workers Union all united to oppose Chávez's regime.[163][168] The prominent businessman Pedro Carmona (1941–) was chosen as the CD's leader.[163] They received support from various foreign sources.

Chávez visiting the USS Yorktown, a US Navy ship docked at Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles, in 2002.

The CD and other opponents of Chávez's Bolivarian government accused it of trying to turn Venezuela from a democracy into a dictatorship by centralising power amongst its supporters in the Constituent Assembly and granting Chávez increasingly autocratic powers. Many of them pointed to Chávez's personal friendship with Cuba's Fidel Castro and the one-party socialist government in Cuba as a sign of where the Bolivarian government was taking Venezuela.[163] Others did not hold such a strong view, but still argued that Chávez was a "free-spending, authoritarian populist" whose policies were detrimental to the country.[169] For instance, Venezuelan lawyer and academic Allan R. Brewer-Carías, a prominent and vocal opponent of Chávez, made the claim that under his regime the country had "suffered a tragic setback regarding democratic standards, suffering a continuous, persistent and deliberate process of demolishing institutions and destroying democracy, which has never before been experienced in the constitutional history of the country."[170] Other academics have argued that the opposite was true, and that "the Chávez government is in fact more democratic than previous ones" because of the increased checks and balances introduced by the 1999 constitution and the introduction of workers' councils.[171]

The pro-Chávez political analyst Gregory Wilpert argued, in his study of the Bolivarian administration, that the opposition movement was dominated primarily by members of the middle and upper classes. He further argued that this wealthy elite was particularly furious at the Bolivarian government because they themselves had lost much of their dominance over Venezuelan politics with the introduction of the 1999 constitution and the relegitimization of all areas of government that it required.[172] He went on to argue that this wealthy elite subsequently used its control of the country's mass media to create an anti-Chávez campaign aimed primarily at the middle classes, stirring up the latent racism and classism that existed in Venezuelan culture.[173][174] One of the most prominent examples of this was through the popularization of the racist term ese mono ("that monkey") which began to be applied to Chávez by his opponents,[141][175][176] who would also often accuse him of being "vulgar and common".[158][175][177] Both Venezuelan and Western opposition media also characterized Chávez's supporters, who were known as the Chávistas, as being "young, poor, politically unsophisticated, antidemocratic masses" who were controlled, funded and armed by the state,[178] and they were regularly referred to as "hordes" in opposition media discourse, which also commonly referred to the Bolivarian Circles as "terror circles".[176] Such descriptions have been refuted by certain academics, such as Cristóbal Valencia Ramírez, who, after studying Chavista groups, have argued that they consist of people from many classes of society, and are educated and largely non-violent.[179] Chavista-run organizations have since claimed to have been the target of violent attacks from opposition groups: for instance, the Ezequiel Zamora National Farmers' Coordinator estimated that 50 Chavista leaders involved in the land-reform program had been assassinated during 2002 and 2003.[180]

Coup, strikes and the recall referendum

The 11 April 2002 rally in Caracas

On 11 April 2002, mass protests took place in Caracas against the Bolivarian government, during which guns were fired, and violence ensued involving both pro- and anti-Chávez supporters, the police and the army.[181] Twenty people were killed and over 110 were wounded.[182] A group of high-ranking anti-Chávez military officers, likely supported by figures in the business community, media and certain political parties[which?], had been planning to launch a coup against Chávez and used the civil unrest as an opportunity.[183] After the plotters gained significant power, Chávez agreed to step down, and was transferred by army escort to La Orchila, and although he requested to be allowed to leave the country, he refused to officially resign from the presidency at the time. Nonetheless, the wealthy business-leader Pedro Carmona declared himself president of an interim government.[184] Carmona abolished the 1999 constitution and appointed a small governing committee to run the country.[156] Protests in support of Chávez along with insufficient support for Carmona's regime, which many felt was implementing totalitarian measures, led to Carmona's resignation and Chávez was returned to power on 14 April.[185]

Chávez's reaction to the coup attempt was to moderate his approach, implementing a new economic team that appeared to be more centrist and reinstated the old board of directors and managers of the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), whose replacement had been one of the reasons for the coup.[186][187] At the same time, the Bolivarian government began preparing for potential future uprisings or even a US invasion by increasing the country's military capacity, purchasing 100,000 AK-47 assault rifles and several helicopters from Russia, as well as a number of Super Tucano light attack planes from Brazil. Troop numbers were also increased, with Chávez announcing in 2005 the government's intention to increase the number of military reserves from 50,000 to 2,000,000.[188]

In December 2002, the Chávez presidency faced a two-month management strike at the PdVSA when he initiated management changes. As Wilpert noted, "While the opposition labelled this action a 'general strike', it was actually a combination of management lockout, administrative and professional employee strike, and general sabotage of the oil industry."[189] The Chávez government's response was to fire about 19,000 striking employees for illegally abandoning their posts, and then employing retired workers, foreign contractors and the military to do their jobs instead. This move further damaged the strength of Chávez's opposition by removing the many managers in the oil industry who had been supportive of their cause to overthrow Chávez.[189]

Following the failure of these two attempts to remove Chávez from power, the opposition finally resorted to legal means in order to try to do so. The 1999 constitution had introduced the concept of a recall referendum into Venezuelan politics, and so the opposition called for such a referendum to take place. A 2004 referendum to recall Chávez was defeated. 70% of the eligible Venezuelan population turned out to vote, with 59% of voters deciding to keep the president in power.[159][190] Unlike his original 1998 election victory, this time Chávez's electoral support came almost entirely from the poorer working classes rather than the middle classes, who "had practically abandoned Chávez" after he "had consistently moved towards the left in those five and a half years".[191] Meanwhile, some figures in the opposition movement began calling for the United States military to intervene and invade the country in order to topple Chávez.[190]

"Socialism of the 21st century"

[Bolivarian] socialism would be 'based in solidarity, in fraternity, in love, in justice, in liberty, and in equality' and would mean the 'transformation of the economic model, increasing cooperativism, collective property, the submission of private property to the social interest and to the general interest', created 'from the popular bases, with the participation of the communities'. This socialism was not a dogma, however, but 'must be constructed every day'.


The various attempts at overthrowing the Bolivarian government from power had only served to further radicalize Chávez. In January 2005, he began openly proclaiming the ideology of "Socialism of the 21st Century", something that was distinct from his earlier forms of Bolivarianism, which had been social democratic in nature, merging elements of capitalism and socialism. He used this new term to contrast the democratic socialism which he wanted to promote in Latin America from the Marxist-Leninist socialism that had been spread by socialist states like the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China during the 20th century, arguing that the latter had not been truly democratic, suffering from a lack of participatory democracy and an excessively authoritarian governmental structure.[49]

In May 2006, Chávez visited Europe in a private capacity, where he announced plans to supply cheap Venezuelan oil to poor working class communities in the continent. The Mayor of London Ken Livingstone welcomed him, describing him as "the best news out of Latin America in many years".[192]

Third Presidential Term: 10 January 2007 – 10 January 2013

In the presidential election of December 2006, which saw a 74% voter turnout, Chávez was once more elected, this time with 63% of the vote, beating his closest challenger Manuel Rosales, who conceded his loss.[190] The election was certified as being free and legitimate by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Carter Center.[193][194][195] After this victory, Chávez promised an "expansion of the revolution."[196]

United Socialist Party of Venezuela and domestic policy

On 15 December 2006, Chávez publicly announced that those leftist political parties who had continually supported him in the Patriotic Pole would unite into one single, much larger party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV).[105] In the speech which he gave announcing the PSUV's creation, Chávez declared that the old parties must "forget their own structures, party colours and slogans, because they are not the most important thing for the fatherland."[105] According to political analyst Barry Cannon, the purpose of creating the PSUV was to "forge unity amongst the disparate elements [of the Bolivarian movement], providing grassroots input into policy and leadership formation, [and] uniting the grassroots and leadership into one single body."[197] It was hoped that by doing so, it would decrease the problems of clientelism and corruption and also leave the movement less dependent on its leadership:[197] as Chávez himself declared, "In this new party, the bases will elect the leaders. This will allow real leaders to emerge."[197]

The logo for the PSUV, Chávez's socialist political party founded in 2007.

Chávez had initially proclaimed that those leftist parties which chose to not dissolve into the PSUV would have to leave the government, however, after several of those parties supporting him refused to do so, he ceased to issue such threats.[198] There was initially much grassroots enthusiasm for the creation of the PSUV, with membership having rising to 5.7 million people by 2007,[197][199] making it the largest political group in Venezuela.[200] The United Nations' International Labour Organization however expressed concern over some voters' being pressured to join the party.[201]

In 2007, the Bolivarian government set up a constitutional commission in order to review the 1999 constitution and suggest potential amendments to be made to it. Led by the prominent pro-Chávez intellectual Luis Britto García, the commission came to the conclusion that the constitution could include more socially progressive clauses, such as the shortening of the working week, a constitutional recognition of Afro Venezuelans and the elimination of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.[190] It also suggested measures that would have increased many of the president's powers, for instance increasing the presidential term limit to seven years, allowing the president to run for election indefinitely and centralizing powers in the executive.[190] The government put the suggested changes to a public referendum in December 2007.[202] Abstention rate was high however, with 43.95% of registered voters not turning out, and in the end the proposed changes were rejected by 50.65% of votes.[190][203] This would prove to the first electoral loss that Chávez had faced in the thirteen electoral contests held since he took power,[190] something analysts argued was due to the top-down nature of the changes, as well as general public dissatisfaction with "the absence of internal debate on its content, as well as dissatisfaction with the running of the social programmes, increasing street crime, and with corruption within the government."[204]

In order to ensure that his Bolivarian Revolution became socially engrained in Venezuela, Chávez discussed his wish to stand for re-election when his term ran out in 2013, and spoke of ruling beyond 2030.[205] Under the 1999 constitution, he could not legally stand for re-election again, and so brought about a referendum on 15 February 2009 to abolish the two-term limit for all public offices, including the presidency.[206] Approximately 70% of the Venezuelan electorate voted, and they approved this alteration to the constitution with over 54% in favor, allowing any elected official the chance to try to run indefinitely.[205][206][207]

Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas and the Bank of the South

Chávez (far right) with fellow Latin American leftist presidents in 2009. From left to right: Paraguay's Fernando Lugo, Bolivia's Evo Morales, Brazil's Lula da Silva and Ecuador's Rafael Correa.

The Bolivarian government placed a great emphasis on providing financial and medical aid to the rest of Latin America, bolstered by the profits produced by the Venezuela oil industry: indeed, in the first eight months of 2007 alone, Venezuela spent $8.8 billion in doing so, something which was "unprecedented for a Latin American country" in terms of scale.[208] Adding to this, the Chávez administration sought greater political, economic and military alliances with those Latin American countries who had seen leftist, and in particular socialist governments elected in the early 21st century. The widespread success of left-leaning candidates at the time had led to what political analysts have described as a "pink tide" sweeping the region, although there was a great deal of diversity within this leftist trend. Those that became the closest allies of Bolivarian Venezuela were Evo Morales and his Movement for Socialism, which was elected into power in Bolivia in 2005, and Rafael Correa and his PAIS Alliance, who won the election in Ecuador in 2006.[106]

In 2007, the socialist Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front were elected into government in Nicaragua, and his administration immediately entered into deals with the Venezuelan government. On Ortega's first day in power, Chávez announced plans to aid the impoverished Central American country by forgiving the $30 million it owed Venezuela, and agreed to supply them with a further gift of $10 million in aid, as well as providing them with a $20-million loan with little or no interest and designed to benefit the country's poor.[209]

In 2004, Venezuela had been one of the founding states in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA).

As of 26 September 2009, Chávez, along with allies such as Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia, had set up a regional bank and development lender called Bank of the South, based in Caracas, an attempt to distance himself from financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. Chávez first mentioned the project before winning the Presidential election in 1998.[210] Chávez maintains that unlike other global financial organizations, the Bank of the South will be managed and funded by the countries of the region with the intention of funding social and economic development without any political conditions on that funding.[211] The project is endorsed by Nobel Prize winning, former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz, who said: "One of the advantages of having a Bank of the South is that it would reflect the perspectives of those in the south," and that "It is a good thing to have competition in most markets, including the market for development lending."[212]

Chávez on a visit to Guatemala.

As the Arab Spring erupted across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011, Chávez openly criticised those leaders who had been backed by the U.S., such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, but at the same time championed those who had adhered to Arab socialist ideals, such as Syria's Bashar al-Assad, whom he called "a humanist and a brother" in spite of Assad's government's violent crackdown on protesters.[213] Following the outbreak of the Libyan civil war, in which forces opposed to the socialist government rose up against the regime, Chávez, who had always had good international relations with Libya – describing its ceremonial leader Muammar Gaddafi as "a friend of mine"[213] – offered to act as an intermediary between the government and the rebel-controlled National Transitional Council (NTC); however the latter declined the offer.[214] During the subsequent 2011 military intervention in Libya, in which western forces attacked the Libyan army in support of the NTC, Chávez criticised the "indiscriminate bombing" of the country, accusing the United States of simply trying to "lay its hands on Libya's oil".[215] Upon the killing of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011, Chávez proclaimed that "We shall remember Gaddafi our whole lives as a great fighter, a revolutionary and a martyr. They assassinated him. It is another outrage."[216]

Cancer and further nationalisation

On 30 June 2011, Chávez confirmed in a televised address from Havana, Cuba, that he was recovering from a 10 June operation to remove an abscessed tumor with cancerous cells.[217] Vice President Elías Jaua declared that the President remained in "full exercise" of power and that there was no need to transfer power due to his absence from the country.[218] A 2 July report in El Periódico de Catalunya reported that, according to Venezuelan diplomatic sources, Chávez had "colon cancer that has perforated the intestinal wall and has caused an infection in the abdomen."[219] On 3 July, the Venezuelan government denied, however, that Chávez had colon cancer, and stated that the tumour had been completely removed, further stating that Chávez was heading for "complete recovery".[220] On 17 July 2011, television news reported that Chávez had returned to Cuba for further cancer treatments.[221]

Chávez gave a public appearance on his 57th birthday, in which he stated that his health troubles had led him to radically reorient his life towards a "more diverse, more reflective and multi-faceted" outlook, and he went on to call on the middle classes and the private sector to get more involved in his Bolivarian Revolution, something he saw as "vital" to its success.[222] Soon after this speech, in August Chávez announced that his government would nationalise Venezuela's gold industry, taking it over from Russian-controlled company Rusoro, whilst at the same time also moving the country's gold stocks, which were largely stored in western banks, to banks in Venezuela's political allies like Russia, China and Brazil.[223]

On 9 July 2012, Chávez declared himself fully recovered from cancer just three months before an election in which he is seeking another six-year term as the country's leader.[224] However, his claim of being cancer-free was questionable.[225] Chávez has warned that if a right-wing president takes office, it would mean an end of social reforms and lead to civil war.[226] On 7 October 2012, Chavez won his fourth term by defeating opposition candidate Henrique Capriles, paving the way for a further six years in office.

Fourth Presidential Term: 10 January 2013 – 10 January 2019

On 7 October 2012, Chávez won election as president for a fourth time, defeating Henrique Capriles and will serve for six years.[2]

Political philosophy

19th century general and politician Simón Bolívar provides a basis for Chávez's political ideas.

Hugo Chávez defines his political position as Bolivarianism, an ideology developed by himself which he claims is influenced by Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), a 19th-century general who led the fight against the imperialist Spanish authorities, and who is widely revered across Latin America today. Chávez claims that his movement is inspired by Bolivar because Bolivar is widely popular, so this puts the stamp of approval of Bolivar on his political movement. Along with Bolívar, the other two primary influences upon Bolivarianism are Simón Rodríguez (1769–1854), a philosopher who was Bolívar's tutor and mentor, and Ezequiel Zamora, (1817–1860), the Venezuelan Federalist general.[227] Political analyst Gregory Wilpert, in his study of Chávez's politics, noted that "The key ingredients for Chávez's revolutionary Bolivarianism can be summarized as: an emphasis on the importance of education, the creation of civilian-military unity, Latin American integration, social justice, and national sovereignty. In many ways this is not a particularly different set of principles and ideas to those of any other Enlightenment or national liberation thinker."[228]

Although he has been a leftist ever since his days at the military academy, since becoming president Chávez's political position has progressed further left, rejecting democratic leftist ideologies like social democracy or the Third Way and instead embracing socialism. He has propagated what he calls "socialism for the 21st century", but according to Gregory Wilpert, "Chávez has not clearly defined twenty-first century socialism, other than to say that it is about establishing liberty, equality, social justice, and solidarity. He has also indicated that it is distinctly different from state socialism", as implemented by the governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.[229] As a part of his socialist ideas, he has emphasised the role of so-called "participatory democracy", which he claims increases democratic participation, and is implemented through the foundation of the Venezuelan Communal Councils and Bolivarian Circles which he cites as examples of grassroots and participatory democracy.[230]

[D]emocracy is impossible in a capitalist system. Capitalism is the realm of injustice and a tyranny of the richest against the poorest. Rousseau said, 'Between the powerful and the weak all freedom is oppressed. Only the rule of law sets you free.' That's why the only way to save the world is through socialism, a democratic socialism... [Democracy is not just turning up to vote every five or four years], it's much more than that, it's a way of life, it's giving power to the people... it is not the government of the rich over the people, which is what's happening in almost all the so-called democratic Western capitalist countries.


Chávez is well acquainted with the various traditions of Latin American socialism, espoused by such figures as Colombian politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán,[231] former Chilean president Salvador Allende,[231] former Peruvian president Juan Velasco Alvarado,[20] former Panamanian president Omar Torrijos[24] and the Cuban revolutionaries Che Guevara and Fidel Castro.[231] Other indirect influences on Chávez's political philosophy are the writings of American linguist Noam Chomsky[232] and the Gospel teachings of Jesus Christ.[233][234]

Chávez's connection to Marxism is a complex one. In May 1996, he gave an interview with Agustín Blanco Muñoz in which he remarked that "I am not a Marxist, but I am not anti-Marxist. I am not communist, but I am not anti-communist."[235] He is, however, well versed in many Marxist texts, having read the works of many Marxist theoreticians, and has often publicly quoted them. Various international Marxists have supported his government, believing it to be a sign of proletariat revolution as predicted in Marxist theory.[236] In 2010, Hugo Chávez proclaimed support for the ideas of Marxist Leon Trotsky, saying "When I called him (former Minister of Labour, José Ramón Rivero)" Chávez explained, "he said to me: 'president I want to tell you something before someone else tells you ... I am a Trotskyist', and I said, 'well, what is the problem? I am also a Trotskyist! I follow Trotsky's line, that of permanent revolution," and then cited Marx and Lenin.[237][238]

On 24 December 2005, Chávez stated that "[t]he world is for all of us, then, but it so happens that a minority, the descendants of the same ones that crucified Christ, the descendants of the same ones that kicked Bolívar out of here and also crucified him in their own way over there in Santa Marta, in Colombia. A minority has taken possession all of the wealth of the world."[239] Accusations of antisemitism have been leveled against Chávez because of these comments.[240]

Policy overview

Economic and social policy

Venezuela is a major producer of oil products, which remain the keystone of the Venezuelan economy. Chávez has gained a reputation as a price hawk in OPEC, pushing for stringent enforcement of production quotas and higher target oil prices. According to Cannon, the state income from oil revenue has "increas[ed] from 51% of total income in 2000 to 56% 2006";[241] oil exports "have grown from 77% in 1997 [...] to 89% in 2006";[241] and "this dependence on oil is one of the chief problems facing the Chávez government".[241] The economist Mark Weisbrot, in an analysis of the Chávez administration, said: "The current economic expansion began when the government got control over the national oil company in the first quarter of 2003. Since then, real (inflation-adjusted) GDP has nearly doubled, growing by 94.7 percent in 5.25 years, or 13.5 percent annually."[242] For the year 2009, the Venezuelan economy shrank by an average of 2.9% due to the global recession.[243] Chávez has stated that the Venezuelan economy will most likely continue shrinking throughout 2010, citing both the IMF and World Bank. Chávez sees the economic crisis as "an opportunity for socialism to spread and take root..".[244] According to Ian James, citing estimates from the Venezuelan Central Bank, the Venezuelan government "controls" the same percentage of the economy as when Chávez was elected in 1998, with "the private sector still control[ling] two-thirds of Venezuela's economy".[245]

Since Chávez was elected in 1998, over 100,000 state-owned cooperatives—which claim to represent approximately 1.5 million people—have been formed with the assistance of government start-up credit and technical training;[246] and the creation and maintenance, as of September 2010, of over 30,000 communal councils, examples of localised participatory democracy; which he intended to be integrated into regional umbrella organizations known as "Communes in Construction".[247] In 2010, Chávez supported the construction of 184 communes, housing thousands of families, with $23 million in government funding. The communes produce some of their own food, and are able to make decisions by popular assembly of what to do with government funds.[248] In September 2010, Chávez announced the location of 876 million bolivars ($203 million) for community projects around the country, specifically communal councils and the newly formed communes. Chávez also criticised the bureaucracy still common in Venezuela saying, when in discussion with his Communes Minister Isis Ochoa, that "All of the projects must be carried out by the commune, not the bureaucracy." The Ministry for Communes, which oversees and funds all communal projects, was initiated in 2009.[247]

Chávez has also supported the creation of a series of Bolivarian Missions which are claimed to be aimed at providing public services to improve economic, cultural, and social conditions. A 2010 OAS report[249] indicated achievements in addressing illiteracy, healthcare and poverty,[250] and economic and social advances.[251]

Barry Cannon writes that "most areas of spending have increased".[252] "[S]pending on education as a percentage of GDP stood at 5.1% in 2006, as opposed to 3.4% in the last year of the Caldera government."[252] Spending on health "has increased from 1.6% of GDP in 2000 to 7.71% in 2006".[252] Spending on housing "receives low public support", increasing only "from 1% in GDP to 1.6% in 2006".[252] Teresa A. Meade, writes that Chávez's popularity "rests squarely on the lower classes who have benefited from these health initiatives and similar policies [...] poverty rates fell from 42 to 34 percent from 2000 to 2006, still leaving over 30 percent in this oil-rich nation below the poverty line".[253]

The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) reports that the Venezuelan economy grew on average by 11.85% in the period 2004–2007.[254] According to The Washington Post, citing statistics from the United Nations, poverty in Venezuela stood at 28% in 2008,[255] down from 55.44% in 1998 before Chávez got into office.[256] Economist Mark Weisbrot found that, "During the ... economic expansion, the poverty rate [was] cut by more than half, from 54 percent of households in the first half of 2003 to 26 percent at the end of 2008. Extreme poverty has fallen even more, by 72 percent. These poverty rates measure only cash income, and does take into account increased access to health care or education."[242][257] Nicholas Kozloff, Chávez's biographer, stated of Chávez's economic policies: "Chávez has not overturned capitalism, he has done much to challenge the more extreme, neo-liberal model of development."[208]


In the 1980s and 1990s health and nutrition indexes in Venezuela were generally low, and social inequality in access to nutrition was high.[258] Chávez has frequently made it his stated goal to lower inequality in the access to basic nutrition, and to achieve food sovereignty for Venezuela.[259] The main strategy for making food available to all economic classes has been a controversial policy of fixing price ceilings for basic staple foods implemented in 2003.[260]

Despite these goals, however, Venezuela has been plagued by shortages of staples, including milk, meat, and coffee throughout Chávez' presidency.[261][262] An independent polling firm which regularly tracks scarcities found that powdered milk could only be found in 42% of grocery stores, and liquid milk was even more scarce.[261] Chávez has blamed "speculators and hoarders" for these scarcities.[262]

Chávez' strategy in response food shortages has consisted mainly in increasing domestic production through nationalizing large parts of the food industry. The price ceilings have increased the demand for basic foods while making it difficult for Venezuela to import goods causing increased reliance on domestic production. So according to commentators this policy may in fact have increased shortages.[261][262]

According to official statistics from the Ministry of Land and Agriculture, soybean production in Venezuela has grown by 858% to 54,420 tons over the past decade, and production of rice has risen by 84%, reaching close to 1.3 million tons yearly.[263] Chávez' presidency has also seen significant increases in milk production, as much as 50% over ten years reported by some sources.[264] Between 1998 and 2006 malnutrition related deaths fell by 50%.[242][265] In October 2009, the Executive Director of the National Institute of Nutrition (INN) Marilyn Di Luca reported that the average daily caloric intake of the Venezuelan people had reached 2790 calories, and that malnutrition had fallen from 21% in 1998 to 6%.[266]

Chávez has been strictly enforcing the price control policy, denouncing anyone who sells food products for higher prices as "speculators".[267] In January 2008, Chávez ordered the military to seize 750 tons of food that sellers were illegally trying to smuggle across the border to sell for higher prices than what was legal in Venezuela.[268] In February 2009, Chávez ordered the military to temporarily seize control of all the rice processing plants in the country and force them to produce at full capacity, which he claimed they had been avoiding in response to the price caps.[269] In May 2010, Chávez ordered the military to seize 120 tons of food from Empresas Polar after inconsistencies in reports from the Empresas Polar conglomerate were said to have been detected by authorities.[270]

In March 2009, the Venezuelan government set minimum production quotas for 12 basic foods that were subject to price controls, including white rice, cooking oil, coffee, sugar, powdered milk, cheese, and tomato sauce, which is intended to stop food companies from evading the law. Business leaders and food producers claimed that the government was forcing them to produce this food at a loss.[271] Chávez has expropriated and redistributed 5 million acres of farmland from large landowners, saying: "The land is not private. It is the property of the state... The land is for those who work it." But, the lack of basic resources has made it difficult or impossible to make full use of the expropriated lands by its new tenants – leading to a lower overall degree of productivity in spite of a larger overall area of land under cultivation.[272]

As part of his strategy of food security Chávez has started a national chain of supermarkets, the Mercal network, which has 16,600 outlets and 85,000 employees that distribute food at highly discounted prices, and runs 6000 soup kitchens throughout the country.[273] In 2008 the amount of discounted food sold through the network was 1.25 metric tonnes,[242] often sold at as much as 40% below the price ceiling set for privately own stores. Simultaneously Chávez has expropriated many private supermarkets.[273] According to Commerce Minister Richard Canan, “The average [savings] for the basic food bundle (at the Mercal Bicentennial markets) is around 30%. There are some products, for example cheese and meat, which reach a savings of 50 to 60% compared with capitalist markets.”[274] The Mercal network is criticized by some commentators as being a part of Chávez's strategy to brand himself as a provider of cheap food, and the shops feature his picture prominently. However, the Mercal network is also subject to frequent scarcities of basic staples such as meat, milk and sugar – and when scarce products arrive, shoppers must often wait in line.[273]

In 2010, after the government nationalized the port at Puerto Cabello, more than 120,000 tons of food sat rotting at the port.[275] In May 2010, during a shortage of beef, at least 40 butchers were detained on charges of speculation for allegedly selling meat above the regulated price; some of them were held at a military base and later strip-searched by police.[276]

Human rights

In the 1999 Venezuelan constitution, 116 of 300 articles were concerned with human rights; these included increased protections for indigenous peoples and women, and established the rights of the public to education, housing, healthcare, and food. It called for dramatic democratic reforms such as ability to recall politicians from office by popular referendum, increased requirements for government transparency, and numerous other requirements to increase localized, participatory democracy, in favor of centralized administration. It gave citizens the right to timely and impartial information, community access to media, and a right to participate in acts of civil disobedience.[150][151]

However, as recently as 2010, Amnesty International has criticized the Chávez administration for targeting critics following several politically motivated arrests.[277] Freedom House lists Venezuela as being "partly free" in its 2011 Freedom in the World annual report, noting a recent decline in civil liberties.[278] A 2010 Organization of American States report found concerns with freedom of expression, human rights abuses, authoritarianism, press freedom, threats to democracy,[279][280] as well as erosion of separation of powers, the economic infrastructure and ability of the president to appoint judges to federal courts.[279][280][281] OAS observors were denied access to Venezuela;[281] Chávez rejected the OAS report, pointing out that its authors did not even come to Venezuela. He said Venezuela should boycott the OAS, which he feels is dominated by the United States; a spokesperson said, "We don't recognize the commission as an impartial institution". He disclaims any power to influence the judiciary.[282] A Venezuelan official said the report distorts and takes statistics out of context, saying that "human rights violations in Venezuela have decreased".[283] Venezuela has said it will not accept an IACHR/OAS visit as long as Santiago Cantón remains its Executive Secretary, unless the IACHR apologizes for what he describes as its support of the 2002 coup.[249][284]

Chávez meets with Hillary Clinton at the Summit of the Americas on 19 April 2009

In 2008, Human Rights Watch released a report reviewing Chávez's human rights record over his first decade in power.[285] The report praises Chávez's 1999 amendments to the constitution which significantly expanded human rights guarantees, as well as mentioning improvements in women's rights and indigenous rights, but notes a "wide range of government policies that have undercut the human rights protections established" by the revised constitution.[285] In particular, the report accuses Chávez and his administration of engaging in discrimination on political grounds, eroding the independence of the judiciary, and of engaging in "policies that have undercut journalists' freedom of expression, workers' freedom of association, and civil society's ability to promote human rights in Venezuela."[286] The Venezuelan government retaliated for the report by expelling members of Human Rights Watch from the country.[287] Subsequently, over a hundred Latin American scholars signed a joint letter with the Council on Hemispheric Affairs criticizing the Human Rights Watch report for its alleged factual inaccuracy, exaggeration, lack of context, illogical arguments, and heavy reliance on opposition newspapers as sources, amongst other things.[288][289][290] The International Labor Organization of the United Nations expressed concern over voters being pressured to join the party.[201]

Chávez, speaking at the 2003 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre

Venezuelan Judge Maria Afiuni was arrested in 2009 on charges of corruption, after she ordered the conditional release on bail of banker Eligio Cedeño, who had been held on charges of fraud and other crimes due to alleged illegal currency trading activities. Some human rights officials allege the arrest was politically motivated; Cedeño "had been in pretrial detention for nearly three years, despite a two-year limit prescribed by Venezuelan law".[291] Cedeño later fled to the U.S. to avoid prosecution. Following Afiuni's arrest, several groups, including the United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Episcopal Conference of Venezuela, Human Rights Watch, the Law Society of England and Wales, the U.S. Department of State, and the European Union Parliament accused Chávez of "creating a climate of fear" among Venezuela's legal profession.[291][292][293][294][295][296][297][298] The European Parliament called this "an attack on the independence of the judiciary by the President of a nation, who should be its first guarantor".[299] A director of Human Rights Watch said, "Once again the Chávez government has demonstrated its fundamental disregard for the principle of judicial independence."[291]

Media and the press

Although the freedom of the press is mentioned by two key clauses in the 1999 Constitution of Venezuela, in 2008, Human Rights Watch criticized Chávez for engaging in "often discriminatory policies that have undercut journalists' freedom of expression."[286] Freedom House lists Venezuela's press as being "Not Free" in its 2011 Map of Press Freedom, noting that "[t]he gradual erosion of press freedom in Venezuela continued in 2010."[300] Reporters Without Borders has criticized the Chávez administration for "steadily silencing its critics".[301] In the group's 2009 Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders noted that "Venezuela is now among the region’s worst press freedom offenders."[301]

The large majority of mass media in Venezuela is privately owned but subject to significant state control. For example, the Venezuelan government has required that all private television stations dedicate at least 25%[clarification needed] of their airtime to programs created by community groups, non-profits, and other independent producers. As of 2007,[dated info] private corporations controlled 80% of the cable television channels, 100% of the newspaper companies, and 706 out of 709 radio stations.[302][303]

In July 2005 Chávez inaugurated TeleSUR, a Pan-American equivalent of Al Jazeera that seeks to challenge the present domination of Latin American television news by Univision and the United States-based CNN en Español.[304] In 2006 Chávez inaugurated a state-funded movie studio called Villa del Cine (English: Cinema City).[305] According to Chávez, the goal of this indigenous film industry is to counter what he describes "the dictatorship of Hollywood", the lack of alternative media.[306]

Chávez with fellow South American presidents of Argentina and Brazil.

Chávez has a Twitter account with more than 3,200,000 followers as of August 2012.[307][308][309] Chávez's Twitter account has been described as a way for people to bypass bureaucracy and contact the president directly. There is a team of 200 people to sort through suggestions and comments sent via Twitter. Chávez has said Twitter is "another mechanism for contact with the public, to evaluate many things and to help many people",[310] and that he sees Twitter as "a weapon that also needs to be used by the revolution".[311] In a Twitter report released in June 2010 Venezuela is third globally for the prevalence of Twitter with 19% of the population using it, nearly 2/3 of all internet users. This is behind Indonesia with 20.8% and Brazil with 20.5%.[312]

In 2010 availability of Internet service in Venezuela rose by 43%. The Venezuelan state has instituted Infocenters, community spaces equipped with computers with internet connections which are free to use.[312] By January 2011 there were 737 infocenters, and the programme was awarded a prize by UNESCO.[313]

In the days before the 11 April 2002 coup, the five main private Venezuelan TV stations gave advertising space to those calling for anti-Chávez demonstrations.[314][315] In 2006, Chávez announced that the terrestrial broadcast license for RCTV would not be renewed, due to its refusal to pay taxes and fines, and its alleged open support of the 2002 coup attempt against Chávez, and role in helping to instigate the oil strike in 2002–2003.[316] RCTV was transmitted via cable and satellite and was widely viewable in Venezuela until January 2010, when it was excluded by cable companies in response to an order of National Commission of Telecommunications.[317][318][319] The failure to renew its terrestrial broadcast license had been condemned by a multitude of international organizations, many of whom have claimed that the closure was politically motivated, and was intended to silence government critics.[320][321][322][323]

Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) questioned whether, in the event a television station openly supported and collaborated with coup leaders, the station in question would not be subject to even more serious consequences in the United States or any other Western nation.[324] In a poll conducted by Datanalisis, almost 70 percent of Venezuelans polled opposed the shut-down.[325]

Crime and punishment

Bolivarian memorabilia for sale in Venezuela, 2006.

During the 1980s and 1990s there was a steady increase in crime in Latin America, and Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela and Brazil all had homicide rates above the regional average.[326] The major reasons for high levels of crime in Latin America are high inequality, low incarceration rates and small police forces.[327]

During Chávez's administration, homicide rates have more than doubled, with one NGO finding the rate to have nearly quadrupled.[328][329] The NGO found that the number of homicides increased from 6,000 in 1999 to 19,000 in 2011.[330][331] Kidnappings have also become increasingly common.[332] Caracas in 2010 had the world's highest murder rate.[333] Chávez maintains that the nation is no more violent now than it was when he took office.[334] Some claim that the current administration, or president Chávez himself is to blame for the rises in crime rates. Although critical of Chávez, a recent International Crisis Group report claimed that when Chávez took office, there were factors beyond his control that led to the crime phenomenon. The study went on to say that cross border activity, mainly with Colombia, is also an important factor. It claims that international organised crime filters between the two countries and leads to higher rates of kidnapping, drug trafficking and homicides. Furthermore, supporters claim that the states with the highest murder rates are controlled by the opposition.[335]

Citizens now believe that crime is a serious problem and that police were themselves a factor in the increase in crime. Between 2000 and 2007, 6,300 police were investigated for violations of human rights. Because decentralization of police was blamed for their ineffectiveness, the 1999 constitution required the National Assembly to form a national police force; however, legislation on this became bogged down in legislative discussions. In 2006, the government established the National Commission for Police Reform (Conarepol), in which a range of civil society representatives, politicians and academics investigated law enforcement in Venezuela and made recommendations. This included setting up a national police force designed to operate with high standards of professionalism and specific training in human rights. It also included initiatives whereby communal councils can participate in police supervision, by being able to request investigations into police behaviour and file recommendations and complaints.[330]

In 2008, Chávez passed a decree designed to implement Conarepol's recommendation on the national police force, and the National Bolivarian Police (PNB),[336][337] and Experimental Security University began operations in 2009. According to the PNB, murder has been reduced by 60%, robberies by nearly 59%, and gender-based violence has diminished by 66% in the pilot areas where the PNB has been active in and around Caracas.[337] However, not all homicides due to encounters with police are reported.[338] According to the publications El Espectador and Le Monde diplomatique, rising crime in rural and urban areas is partly due to increased cross-border activity by Colombian right-wing paramilitary groups like Águilas Negras.[339]

The decree has been criticized because it was negotiated behind closed doors, and did not follow Conarepol's recommendations to deal with human rights, and because "politicization of the force could undercut the goal of professionalization".[338][340]

Foreign policy

Chávez and then-President of Argentina Néstor Kirchner discuss energy and trade integration projects for South America. They met on 21 November 2005 in Venezuela.

Chávez has refocused Venezuelan foreign policy on Latin American economic and social integration by enacting bilateral trade and reciprocal aid agreements, including his so-called "oil diplomacy".[341][342] Chávez stated that Venezuela has "a strong oil card to play on the geopolitical stage ... It is a card that we are going to play with toughness against the toughest country in the world, the United States."[343] Chávez has focused on a variety of multinational institutions to promote his vision of Latin American integration, including Petrocaribe, Petrosur, and TeleSUR. Bilateral trade relationships with other Latin American countries have also played a major role in his policy, with Chávez increasing arms purchases from Brazil, forming oil-for-expertise trade arrangements with Cuba, and creating unique barter arrangements that exchange Venezuelan petroleum for cash-strapped Argentina's meat and dairy products. Additionally, Chávez worked closely with other Latin American leaders following the 1997 Summit of the Americas in many areas—especially energy integration—and championed the OAS decision to adopt the Anti-Corruption Convention. Chávez also participates in the United Nations Friends groups for Haiti, and is pursuing efforts to join and engage the Mercosur trade bloc to expand the hemisphere's trade integration prospects.[344]


The current presidents of Venezuela and Iran, Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, respectively, have both described themselves on the world stage as opposed to "US imperialism". Citing this commonality of opinion, they regard each other as allies, and they have embarked on a number of initiatives together. For example, on 6 January 2007, the two announced that they would use some money from a previously announced $2bn joint fund to invest in other countries that were "attempting to liberate themselves from the imperialist yoke", in Chávez's words.[345] The two presidents declared an "axis of unity" against "US imperialism".[346]

Chávez has developed strong ties with the government of Iran, in particular in the area of energy production, economic, and industrial cooperation.[347] He has visited Iran on several occasions, the first time in 2001,[348] when he declared that he came to Iran to "prepare the road for peace, justice, stability and progress for the 21st century".[347] Mohamed Khatami also has visited Venezuela on three occasions. During his 2005 visit, Chávez awarded him the Orden del Libertador and called him a "tireless fighter for all the right causes in the world".[349] In May 2006, Chávez expressed his favorable view of the production of nuclear energy in Iran announced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and denied that they had plans to develop atomic weapons.[350] His relationship with Iran and his support of their nuclear program has created concern for the US administration.[351]

Personal life

Chávez has been married twice. He first wed Nancy Colmenares, a woman from a poor family in Chávez's hometown of Sabaneta. Chávez and Colmenares remained married for 18 years, during which time they had three children: Rosa Virginia, María Gabriela, and Hugo Rafael, the latter of whom suffers from behavioural problems.[352] The couple separated soon after Chávez's 1992 coup attempt. During his first marriage, Chávez had an affair with historian Herma Marksman; their relationship lasted nine years.[353] Chávez's second wife was journalist Marisabel Rodríguez de Chávez, whom he divorced in 2000.[354] Through that marriage, Chávez had another daughter, Rosinés.[355] Both María and Rosa have provided Chávez with grandchildren.[352][356] Allegations have been made that Chávez is a womaniser, and has been throughout both his marriages, but these have remained unproven and are contradicted by statements provided by other figures close to him.[357]

Chávez is a Catholic. He intended at one time to become a priest. He sees his socialist policies as having roots in the teachings of Jesus Christ,[358] and he publicly used the slogan of "Christ is with the Revolution!"[359] He has had some disputes with both the Venezuelan Catholic clergy and Protestant groups like the New Tribes Mission.[360][361] Although he has traditionally kept his own faith a private matter, Chávez has over the course of his presidency become increasingly open to discussing his religious views, stating that both his faith and his interpretation of Jesus' personal life and ideology have had a profound impact on his leftist and progressive views.


A painted mural in support of the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) found in Barcelona, Venezuela

The United States-based Time magazine included Hugo Chávez among their list of the world's 100 most influential people in 2005 and 2006.[362][363] In a 2006 list compiled by the British magazine New Statesman, he was voted eleventh in the list of "Heroes of our time".[364] In 2010 the magazine included Chávez in its annual The World's 50 Most Influential Figures.[365] His biographers Marcano and Tyszka believed that within only a few years of his presidency, he "had already earned his place in history as the president most loved and most despised by the Venezuelan people, the president who inspired the greatest zeal and the deepest revulsion at the same time."[366]

During his term, Chávez has been awarded the following honorary degrees:[367]

  • Honorary Doctorate in Political Science – Granted by Kyung Hee University (South Korea) by Rector Chungwon Choue on 16 October 1999.
  • Honorary Doctorate in Jurisprudence – Granted by the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) on 9 March 2001.
  • Honorary Doctorate – Granted by the University of Brasília (Brazil) by Rector Alberto Pérez on 3 April 2001.
  • Honorary Doctorate – Granted by the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russian Federation) on 15 May 2001.
  • Honorary Doctorate in Economics – Granted by the Faculty of Economics and Commerce of Beijing University (People's Republic of China) on 24 May 2001.



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Academic articles

  • Ellner, Steve, S. (2002). "The 'Radical' Thesis on Globalization and the Case of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez". Latin American Perspectives (Thousand oaks, California: SAGE Publications) 29 (6): 88–93. doi:10.1177/0094582X0202900609. JSTOR 3185001.
  • Gibbs, Terry, T. (2006). "Business as Usual: what the Chávez era tells us about democracy under globalisation". Third World Quarterly (London: Routledge) 27 (2): 265–279. doi:10.1080/01436590500492931. JSTOR 4017674.
  • López Maya, Margarita (2003). "Hugo Chávez Frías: His Movement and His Presidency". In Ellner, Steve; Hellinger, Daniel. Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict. Boulder: Lynne Riener. pp. 73–92. ISBN 978-1-58826-297-4.
  • Ramírez, Cristóbal Valencia, C. b. V. (2005). "Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution: Who Are the Chavistas?". Latin American Perspectives (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications) 32 (3): 79–97. doi:10.1177/0094582X05275532. JSTOR 30040243.
  • Sylvia, Ronald D. and Danopoulos, Constantine P., R. D.; Danopoulos, C. P. (2003). "The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela". Third World Quarterly (London: Routledge) 24 (1) (1): 63–76. doi:10.1080/713701367. JSTOR 3993630.
  • Zúquete, José Pedro (Spring 2008). "The Missionary Politics of Hugo Chávez". Latin American Politics and Society (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell) 50 (1): 91–121. doi:10.1111/j.1548-2456.2008.00005.x. JSTOR 30130840.

News articles and reports


Websites and e-publications